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God Moves in
Extraordinary
J A Mclnnis explains the 'act of God' defence as it is applied
to floods and storms in Hong Kong
The concept of 'act of God' as a legal,
defence has been considered in sev-
eral recent local cases including Born
Chief Co (t/a Beijing Restaurant) v Tsai
George and Anor, [1996] 2 HKC 282.
In that case the Defendants raised
the defence to a negligence c laim which
arose because their leaving a rooftop
sliding door open resulted in flood
damage to the Plaintiff's premises d ur-
ing a rainstorm.
Floods or storms are often cited
as classic examples of acts of God
which are themselves typically de-
fined as extraordinary and unfore-
seeable events or accidents that take
place without human intervention.
The elements of this definition had
been considered in local judgments
before Born Chief.
In Star Perry Co Ltd v Owners, of the
M V Argonaut, [1980] HKLR 921,
Barker J considered whether damage
to the Star Ferry pier caused by the M
V Argonaut during a very severe
typhoon fell within the plea. Barker J
held that:
[n my judgment, an act of God is
an accident, due to natural causes,
directly and exclusively without
human intervention which could
not by any amount of ability have
been foreseen, or if foreseen, could
not by the exercise of all reason-
able skill and care have been
avoided.. But many of the cases
speak of the occurrence, the mani-
festation of nature, as having to be
extraordinary. The difficulty is to
know what is meant by "extraor-
dinary". Literally it means "out of
the ordinary" but that does not
advance matters a great deal.
Clearly, it does not mean unique.
Nor can it mean something which
happens regularly. It must refer to
something in between. The mere
fact that it has happened before,
and may happen again, in my
opinion does not prevent it being
an act of God. It must however not
be an ordinary accidental circum-
stance. It must be something
overwhelming. Whether a particu-
lar occurrence amounts to an act
of God must be a matter of fact,
depending upon the circum-
stances of the case.
It was argued, in M V Argonaut that, in
view of the fact that typhoons of vary-
ing intensities occur quite frequently
in. Hong Kong, a typhoon could not be
said to be an extraordinary occurrence.
Barker J disagreed and reasoned
tha t the birth, development, course and
intensity of a typhoon were all unpre-
dictable notwithstanding weather
satellites and improved meteorologi-
cal information. Even though the onset
of a typhoon can be foreseen at least by
a matter of hours, such factors did not,
in his Lordship's judgment, remove
the phenomenon from the category of
an act of God.
With regard to the human interven-
tion aspect of the tests, his lordship
noted that the actions of the crew, eg
human intervention in steering the
vessel, did not preclude the plea.
In another local case, Lee Yau
Cheung v Seto King Tung and Ors,
No 1355 of 1983 a construction worker
was injured when formwork col-
lapsed on him during a storm.
In that case Nazareth J consid-
ered whether strong winds could
constitute an act of God. His lord-
ship referred to Charlesworthand Percy
on Negligence, 7th edition; Nugent v
Smith and, in particular, the views of
Barker J in M V Argonaut to draw out
the significance of the irresistibility
and unforeseeability of such events.
On the facts, it was significant that
the unconsolidated formwork was
unstable, that general forecasts of the
rain and winds had been given and
that some countermeasures could
ultimately have been taken. Hence
he held that the defence failed.
Returning to Born Chief, the issues
were summarised as follows by Liu J:
On behalf of the defendants, the
flooding was submitted to be an
act of God. In Tennent v Earl of
Glasgow Lord Westbury defined
an act of God in the context of
flooding as an escape caused di-
rectly by natural causes without
human intervention in "circum-
stances no human foresight can
provide against and of which
human prudence is not bound
to recognise the possibility". . . .
From the Royal Observatory sta-
tistics available to the judge — It
is reasonably clear that . . . the
heavy rainfall on 15 October 1991
could not be accepted as a possi-
bility that human prudence was
not bound to recognise. There is
no evidence that the rainfall was
so exceptional as to constitute an
act of God. The plea of act of God
fails.
If a distinction can be drawn between
the results in M V Argonaut, Born Chief
and Lee Yau Cheung, it may be that
greater weight was given by Barker J in
M V Argonaut to the harmful magni-
tude of the storm.
If so, it is submitted that the other
cases better accord with legal tests for
acts of God which turn upon notions of
foreseeability and reasonableness, than
they do with theological tests which
focus upon the magnitude of events.
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